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ABSTRACT 
Rachel Dotson: Mobility in Crisis: Security, Rights, and Responsibility on Guatemala 
City Buses 
(Under the Direction of [Rudolf Colloredo-Mansfeld]) 
 
 
 This thesis examines Guatemala City’s contemporary “transportation crisis,” 
including the assassination of over 800 bus drivers over the last several years, and state 
and civil society responses to this crisis. It focuses on the Transmetro, a Bus Rapid 
Transit system implemented by the municipal government that aims to provide secure 
transportation, as well as efforts by civil society groups to address violence on buses 
through campaigns focused on citizenship and human rights. In doing so, it addresses 
broader questions related to state efforts to resolve insecurity through infrastructure 
projects and the visions of security underlying such interventions. Since such efforts go 
beyond the construction of bus lines or the organization of routes to target the attitudes 
and behaviors of city residents, this paper pays particular attention to how projects to 
address violence on buses conceptualize rights and responsibilities of both city residents 
and the municipal state in relation to security. 
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Introduction 
  This paper examines Guatemala City’s contemporary “transportation crisis” and 
government and civil society responses to this crisis, with a focus on two related 
initiatives: the Transmetro, a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system administered by the 
municipal government, and the Transurbano, a system coordinated through a partnership 
between the national government and private bus companies that serves as a feeder 
system, connecting Transmetro routes. In doing so, it addresses broader questions related 
to state efforts to resolve insecurity through infrastructure projects and the accompanying 
expert practices of planning and design, including the visions of security underlying such 
interventions. Since such efforts go beyond the construction of new bus lines or the 
organization of routes to target the attitudes and behaviors of city residents, this paper 
pays particular attention to how projects to address violence on buses conceptualize rights 
and responsibilities of both city residents and the municipal state in relation to security.  
 In order to address these questions, I situate my analysis of Guatemala City’s 
contemporary transportation crisis at the intersection of three literatures: critical 
anthropology of security; studies within anthropology and geography of violence, 
inequality and space in the Latin American city; and anthropologies of infrastructure. 
Emerging studies in the critical anthropology of security examine how the set of logics, 
discourses and practices associated with security, often imagined as universal, are taken 
up in specific contexts (O’Neill et al 2011, O’Neill 2010, Goldstein 2010, Arias 2006).  
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A central focus of this work is how security intersects, co-exists, and conflicts with other 
frameworks for ordering social and political life, such as human and civil rights. Security 
regimes, in many of these analyses, undermine the rights of some individuals (for 
example, gang members) by positioning them as anti-citizens and therefore outside of the 
realm of civil rights (Levenson 2012, O’Neill et al 2011); they perpetuate the dismissal of 
human rights as protection for “the rights of criminals” (Burrell 2010; 2014); and they 
justify state repression, mano dura policies, and extra-judicial violence as necessary and 
legitimate responses to the country’s “security crisis” (Burrell 2010, 2014). At the same 
time, Goldstein (2012) suggests that security can serve as a basis for new human rights 
claims, with demands for the “right to security” extending beyond concerns of crime and 
violence to incorporate social and economic rights, as well. Here, the conception of 
security is expanded to encompass broader conceptions of justice, rights, and wellbeing.  
 In Guatemala City, security has become the dominant idiom through which the 
municipal government legitimizes its projects and policies, most ostensibly through its 
mano dura (iron fist) approach to crime and violence, but also through investment in 
urban infrastructure and the revitalization of public space. Civil society organizations 
claiming to represent the city’s residents articulate their agendas in the language of 
security as well, though these groups are far from homogenous in their understandings of 
security and strategies for achieving it. Additionally, the distinction between state and 
non-state security projects is often less than clear, as the municipal government partners 
with international funders1 and negotiates with private business and organized crime in 
order to modernize the city’s transportation systems, and civil society organizations act 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  Transmetro,	  like	  BRT	  systems	  throughout	  the	  region,	  received	  planning	  and	  technical	  support	  from	  international	  funder,	  principally	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank.	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from a range of positions in relation to the municipal and national state, from antagonism 
to collaboration to competition for power.  This paper contributes to discussions within 
the critical anthropology of security by examining multiple projects aimed at addressing 
violence on Guatemala City buses-- from the introduction of the municipal-run BRT 
system to the Defensoría’s efforts to define secure transportation as a human right-- with 
attention to the conceptions of rights and responsibilities, of both city residents and the 
municipal state, deployed within these projects.  
 My discussion here also engages with the work of anthropologists and 
geographers who have examined the social and spatial reconfiguration of Latin American 
cities over the past two decades in the context of heightened urban violence and ongoing 
inequality (Caldiera 2000, Moodie 2010, O’Neill et al. 2011, Arias and Goldstein 2010, 
Rodgers 2009, Dinzey-Flores 2010). These scholars have pointed to the privatization of 
supposedly public goods, including security, and the increasing segregation and 
fragmentation of both infrastructure and public space, what Graham and Marvin call 
“splintering urbanism” (2001). Security-driven infrastructure and urban development 
projects, both publically and privately funded, have been critical to this process.  Rodgers 
(2004), for one example, describes how the Nicaraguan state’s investment in the 
construction of high-speed road systems has facilitated the development of “fortified 
networks” which allow elites to live, work and move through networks of secure spaces, 
disembedded from the rest of the city.  
 Such processes are highly visible in Guatemala City, especially in the form of 
urban renewal projects that have “cleaned up” public spaces while making them less 
accessible to some city residents, such as those working in the informal economy 
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(O’Neill el al 2011, Mérida 2011, AVANCSO 2003). However, the government’s 
investment in integrated and accessible public bus transportation in the form of the 
Transmetro and Transurbano projects as a response to insecurity complicates this picture 
of urban fragmentation and state withdrawal. The system’s expansion has been halting 
and remains far from complete, and the entrenched systemic presence of private bus 
companies in the overall urban transportation system, which I discuss at length below, 
has prevented the municipal government from developing a fully public system. The 
following discussion of the planning and implementation of the Transmetro and 
Transurbano, then, illustrates the complexities of a security-driven urban development 
project that defies neat categorization as an example of either strong state investment in 
security and access, or of neoliberal forms of state withdrawal.  
  To trace the social aims and effects of transportation planning in Guatemala City, 
I also employ theoretical tools from anthropologies of infrastructure. Abrams, citing 
Weber, suggests that in order to demystify the state, we should turn our attention from 
defining the state and its boundaries to examining the practices through which state 
power is legitimated (1988:63). Anthropological studies of infrastructure and planning 
provide a valuable approach to demystifying the state by allowing for a micro-level 
examination of the visions, processes, relationships, and resources through which specific 
state projects are imagined and realized. Rather than viewing infrastructure as a product 
of predetermined and unified conceptions of development and modernity, ethnographies 
of infrastructure and planning examine the processes of negotiation, compromise, and 
improvisation through which such projects are realized (Barker 2005; Harvey 2010; 
Holston 1989; Humphrey 2005). Drawing on these discussions, this paper does not view 
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the Transmetro and Transurbano systems as straightforward products of official processes 
of planning and engineering, and therefore as transparent reflections of the visions of 
their designers and funders. Rather, it views them as the highly contingent and unstable 
products of messy (and at times violent) processes of negotiation between a range of state 
and non-state actors, including not only planners and funders but also private business 
and organized crime. Thus, this analysis provides a nuanced sense of how visions and 
rhetoric of security are shaped, and often severely compromised, by political and 
economic realities.   
 Several ethnographies examine how infrastructure systems function as political 
technologies, allowing their designers to “act at a distance” (Latour 1992) to shape the 
attitudes, behaviors, and social practices of users (Kooy and Baker 2008, McFarlane and 
Rutherford 2008, Von Schnitzler 2008). Drawing on this scholarship, this research 
examines the functions of infrastructure in Guatemala City, and specifically how 
transportation infrastructure is employed by politicians and planners to shape both urban 
space and the subjects who inhabit it. While an emphasis on planning draws attention to 
political and social work of infrastructure, networks do not always function as intended. 
The forms of unpredictability introduced by the physical and social environment in which 
systems operate, as well as the inevitable gap between the users imagined by designers 
and the “user in flesh” (Latour 1992), open possibilities for subversion or appropriation 
of infrastructure technologies (Anand 2011, Spitulnik 2002). These studies suggest the 
need to examine not only the social and political work of planning Guatemala City’s 
transportation systems, but also how these projects work out on the ground, including the 
perceptions and responses of users. While primarily focused on violent crime on 
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Guatemala City buses and responses by the municipal state and civil society groups, the 
following analysis also provides insight into how city residents, including bus riders and 
drivers, engage with the still incomplete Transmetro project.    
 This paper contributes to the above-outlined discussions through a historical and 
ethnographic description of violence and insecurity on Guatemala City buses. I draw on 
participant observation, interviews, informal conversations with Guatemala City 
residents, and analysis of municipal government documents to describe “transportation 
crises” as well as state and civil society attempts to address these crises. Research in 
Guatemala City was conducted in June and July of 2013 and June and July of 2014. 
Informants were identified through personal contacts, and include city residents from a 
wide range of socioeconomic backgrounds as well as political and professional positions, 
including human rights advocates, researchers, taxi drivers, domestic workers, students, 
and business owners. Part one places violence on city buses, and specifically the 
extortion and assassination of bus drivers over the past decade, in the context of a longer 
history of transportation crisis, as well as the relations of capital and labor that underlie 
the city’s bus systems. The second section describes the implementation of the 
Transmetro and Transurbano systems, which have among their primary aims the 
reduction in violent crime on buses, as well as the potential and limitations to these 
infrastructural responses to insecurity.  The final section discusses two additional projects 
to address the city’s transportation crises: citizenship campaigns implemented by the 
Municipal Government and the civil association Compromiso Ciudadana, and the work 
of the Defensoría del Usuario, within the Procurador de Derechos Humanos, to advocate 
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for the rights of bus riders and drivers. In conclusion, I discuss the implications of these 
two responses for understanding both the nature of the crisis and its possible solutions.  
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Section I: Transportation Crisis 
Guatemala City’s First “Transportation Crisis”: 1970s-1990s 
 According to Celia Vargas, professor at San Carlos, Guatemala’s national 
university, there are two distinct phases to the history of “transportation crisis” in 
Guatemala City: the first began in the 1950s and intensified through the early 1990s, and 
was characterized by issues including bus overcrowding to substandard maintenance to 
discrimination against riders based on age, gender and ethnicity. The second began in the 
late 1990s but did not enter into full force until the mid-2000s, with the continuation of 
existing problems as well as the advent of unprecedented levels of violence on city buses. 
A brief history of the capital city’s bus systems helps to situate contemporary violence on 
city buses within this longer history of crisis. 
Guatemala City’s first public or “collective” buses began operating in 1932, and 
quickly replaced existing mule and trolley car systems (CEUR 1995:4).  When the first 
buses were introduced, Guatemala City was home to 250,000 inhabitants and occupied 
ten percent of its current metropolitan area (CEUR 1995:1). However, by the 1950s rates 
of rural-urban migration had increased sharply, and the city began a pattern of population 
growth and urban expansion that would continue over the next half-century. Bus systems 
were unable to keep up with urban growth, and by the 1970s Guatemala City faced what 
was identified at the time as a “transportation crisis,” with slow and inefficient bus 
transport, irregular routes and fares, severe congestion on major thoroughfares, and 
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insufficient coverage, especially in the city’s rapidly growing peripheral settlements 
(González and Hartlben 2012:3).  
 While the buses rojos that emerged from this mid-century process were and 
continue to be owned and managed by private companies, the Municipal and Central 
Governments have regulated routes and fares and have provided limited subsidies for bus 
operation since at least the 1960s (CEUR 1990:3). In general, the power of both private 
bus companies and drivers’ unions have limited the state’s control over the city’s bus 
system; but periodic episodes of popular unrest from the 1970s through the 1990s have 
forced the both the Municipal and Central government to intervene in the provision of 
collective transportation. In 1973, the Sindicato de Pilotos Automovilistas (SPA), the 
city’s bus drivers union, demanded a 50% increase in their daily rate of pay and 
threatened to strike (CEUR 1990:5). In response, bus companies raised fares illegally and 
implemented the pay raise. Bus users protested, and the Municipal Government 
intervened and forced the companies to return fares to the former rate. The Central 
Government, months away from the 1973 national elections, also placed pressure on the 
companies and provided a temporary monthly gas subsidy to offset costs.   
 In 1978, as cycles of guerilla activity and state counterinsurgency violence 
escalated in Guatemala’s northern highlands and popular discontent and state repression 
intensified throughout the country, the bus drivers union (SPA) initiated another series of 
strikes over salary increases (CEUR 1990:5-8). Bus companies again responded with fare 
increases, which tipped off a series of multi-sector mass protests in the capital known as 
the Jornadas Populares de 1978.  Public demonstrations were met with brutal police 
repression, leaving 24 dead and 254 wounded, an episode that marked the beginning of 
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one of the worst periods of selective state repression in the capital during the country’s 
36-year civil war (1960-1996).   
 These cycles of bus driver strikes, authorized or unauthorized fare hikes, popular 
protest, and Municipal and National Government intervention continued through the 
1980s and 1990s. In 1996, municipal planners issued a report containing a series of 
proposals to transform Guatemala City’s bus systems, including the regulation of hours 
and routes, the gradual replacement of antiquated buses with newer vehicles, a reduction 
in the number of private companies in operation, the reform of the 1970 Reglamento de 
Transporte to delegate more responsibility and discretion for transportation planning from 
the Central to the Municipal Government, and the creation of a municipal-run transit 
police (Muni 1996). An assessment undertaken at that time determined that it would not 
be feasible financially or technically for the city to implement a metro or light rail, and 
plans for transportation development remained focused on improving the city’s bus 
systems (González and Hartlben 2012:9). While some limited changes were made to the 
existing bus system, it would be another decade before the report’s recommendations 
would be fully implemented.   
 
Guatemala City’s Second “Transportation Crisis”: 2000-Present 
 In 2011, InSight Crime, an institute that studies organized crime in the Americas, 
identified driving buses in Guatemala City as one of the most dangerous jobs in the 
world.2 The organization’s 2011 article states that 500 drivers have been killed since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Dudley, Stephen.“InSide: The Most Dangerous Job in the World,” InSight Crime, 3/08/2011 
http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/inside-the-most-dangerous-job-in-the-world 
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2007, while other sources put the number at 900 or even higher.3 In the light of such 
figures, organizations that advocate for bus drivers and riders have worked to counter 
what many identify as efforts by the government to falsify statistics in order to minimize 
concerns over transportation-related crime and improve the city’s image for tourists and 
investors. While the Municipal government’s official line is that crime on buses is 
diminishing as the Transmetro and Transurbano systems have made transport safer, 
according to the records of one local organization the total number of murders (drivers, 
auydantes, and passengers) rose from 165 in 2013 to 319 in 2013 to 178 in the first half 
of 2014. This means that far from on their way to being under control, bus driver 
extortion and assassinations are at an all-time high. Such were the conditions of my initial 
ethnographic engagement with security and Guatemala City’s bus systems in the summer 
of 2014.  
 
Economies of Violence on Guatemala City’s Buses 
The advent of widespread extortion schemes in the mid-2000s added terrifying 
and violent dimensions to what was already understood as a crisis in Guatemala City’s 
mass transit system. At the same time, the consolidation of these forms of organized 
crime and violence relied upon a system of capital and labor that was in existence long 
before such schemes began. As explained above, buses in Guatemala City have been 
privately owned and operated, with some degree of state involvement in the form of 
regulations and subsidies, since the advent of mass bus transit in the city in the 1930s. For 
the past two decades, all of the city’s bus companies have been owned by around thirty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Elbein, Saul. “The Most Dangerous Job in the World: How Did 900 Bus Drivers End up Dead in 
Guatemala City?” New Republic. 6/14/2013 http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113293/900-bus-drivers-
dead-guatemala-city-worlds-most-dangerous-job 
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individuals.4  Buses are big business in Guatemala City, and these owners are both 
wealthy and extremely powerful. While widely circulating rumors of owners with 
mansions in Europe and off shore bank accounts may or may not be apocryphal, stories 
of owners’ involvement with organized crime-- including their complicity with the 
extortion and murder of drivers as well as the buying of police officers and politicians 
and assassination of union leaders and others who get in their way-- are equally 
ubiquitous, and less easily dismissed.  
 Bus drivers, those risking their lives every day as they navigate converted US 
school buses through congested city streets, hold a strikingly distinct position within the 
economy of Guatemala City’s bus systems. Drivers are neither employees nor contractors 
of companies. Rather, similar to the case of taxis in the US, they pay by the day to rent 
buses. National government subsidies for fuel, maintenance, and, as of more recently 
security, are given directly to bus companies in exchange for compliance with regulations 
and fare limits. Drivers, union leaders and advocates I spoke with explained that 
subsidies are not passed on to drivers themselves, who have to pay for their own fuel and 
maintenance and are, in the vast majority of the cases, without paid security guards. 
Drivers also employ their own ayudantes (helpers), young men who hang out of the front 
bus door, calling out routes and collecting fares from riders. While ayudantes receive 
notoriously low wages, many are in the business because they hope to be drivers 
themselves one day.  Based on these precarious conditions it comes as very little surprise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Here I do not address the micros or small vans that operate within particular neighborhoods, often where 
coverage by red buses is insufficient or non-existent. However, these buses, while often owner-operated 
and only loosely organized among themselves (and, as I understand it, subject to neither regulations or 
subsidies), are also subject to extortion, though not necessarily by the same groups.  
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that bus drivers have long employed various strategies to ensure their livelihoods, from 
raising tariffs illegally to striking in demand for increased labor protection and security.  
 In the mid 2000s, organized crime groups (with levels and types of organization 
that are still far from understood), began to demand impuestos from bus drivers and 
companies, supposedly in exchange for keeping their routes safe but with the explicit 
threat of violence for failure to pay. These extortion schemes quickly became ubiquitous, 
with few if any companies, routes, or drivers in the city spared from the payment of 
impuestos (taxes).  Extortion schemes take on two main forms. The first targets company 
owners. Generally someone drops off a cheap cell phone in a bus company office, with 
directions that the phone be given to the owner. The phone soon rings, and the speaker 
demands extortion payments that are to begin immediately. In cases in which owners 
initially refuse, drivers are shot on their routes until the first payment is received. 1 
 While this type of extortion continues to happen in Guatemala City, the 
increasingly common arrangement, according to those with whom I spoke, is the direct 
extortion of bus drivers. In an interview, a Guatemala City activist recounted for me the 
typical process: an extortionist approaches one driver from within a particular company, 
demanding that he (nearly all, if not all, drivers are men) collect a particular quantity of 
money from each of the other drivers each week or month. The driver is then responsible 
to ensure that all drivers comply, and to pass the money along to extortionists. In this 
arrangement, impuestos are taken directly from the drivers’ already meager profits, and 
owners are largely spared cost or involvement. As the involvement of company owners 
with organized crime and extortion is widely assumed, it is easy to speculate that the 
increased prevalence of this second arrangement is no coincidence. While the majority of 
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drivers pay what is demanded of them, some refuse, either on principle or because they 
simply can’t afford these “taxes” that can amount to several hundred dollars a month. 
According to the activist cited above, attempts by drivers to organize together and refuse 
to pay, in unions or ad hoc groups, have been largely unsuccessful, and those drivers who 
are unwilling or unable to flee the country have been killed.    
 This second form of extortion interpellates drivers not only as victims but 
sometimes as participants as well. In some cases drivers, who are often only barely 
making ends meet before the imposition of impuestos, have seen extortion schemes as a 
way to collect additional profits. These drivers, after being forcibly recruited to collect 
impuestos from their peers, demand slightly more from each driver and keep the margin 
for themselves. Extortionists often have multiple informants, including drivers and 
auydantes, within a given company, and drivers are generally found out and killed by 
extortionists within a month or two.  Advocates report that drivers’ complicity and 
cooperation with extortionists has become increasingly common in the last few years, as 
many of those who drove buses in the 1990s and early 2000s, before extortion became so 
common, have either been killed or have changed lines of work. These more seasoned 
drivers have been replaced with young people willing to assume the risks now associated 
with the profession, many of whom are rumored to already be involved in gangs or other 
forms of organized crime.  
 If the role of drivers within extortion is less than completely straightforward, 
questions of who is behind these schemes is even more unclear and contentious. Several 
city residents with whom I spoke claimed that Guatemala’s two main gangs or maras, 
Marasalvatrucha and Calle 18, are responsible. These groups are composed primarily of 
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poor, local youth, and their level of centralized organization and operational 
sophistication is highly debated. While maras do use extortion extensively, both to raise 
funds and maintain control of social and economic activities at the local level, they do so 
mainly in the poor, peripheral neighborhoods in which they are active. While their 
capacity to carry out complex extortion schemes at a city-wide level is doubtful, the 
extreme stigma surrounding these gangs has made them an easy scapegoat for criminal or 
violent activity (Levenson 2013; Burrell 2013), including extortion of bus drivers.  
 Regardless of the maras’ role in administering extortion schemes, it seems clear 
that young gang members do serve as the primary source of cheap and disposable labor 
for those administrating and profiting from these operations.  According to Guatemala’s 
Ministerio Publico (federal Justice Department), the average age of people who carry out 
bus driver assassinations is between 14 and 17, and many of these youth belong to a local 
clica or cell of Calle 18 or MS 13.5 These gangs provide a convenient source of labor 
indeed, as these young people often have their own arms, and are willing to kill a bus 
driver for 150 quetzales, or around $20 USD.6 While recent efforts by the Ministerio 
Publico, in the face of intense public pressure, have led to several arrests and 
prosecutions of shooters and accomplices over the past months,7 those who are arrested 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Herrera, Paola. “Niños y adolescentes los más usados en extorciones y asesinatos de pilotos.” 
Noticias.com.gt. 11-11-2010. http://noticias.com.gt/nacionales/20101011-ninos-y-adolescentes-los-mas-
usados-en-extorsiones-y-asesinatos-de-pilotos.html; “Capturan a Presuntos Responsables de Intentar 
Asesinar a un Piloto de Bus.” Gobierno de Guatemala. 9/1/2014. 
http://www.pnc.gob.gt/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1934:capturan-a-presuntos-
responsables-de-intentar-asesinar-a-un-piloto-de-bus&Itemid=410  
 
6 “Sicario Capturado Cobraría Q150 por Asesinar a Piloto.” Siglo 21. 9/09/2014 
http://m.s21.com.gt/afecta/2014/09/09/pilotos-ruta-1-san-miguel-petapa-suspende-servicio-extorsiones 
 
7 “Capturados Cuando Pretendían Asesinar al Piloto de un Bus.” DeGuate. 9/26/14. 
http://www.deguate.com/artman/publish/seguridad-capturados/capturados-cuando-pretendian-asesinar-al-
piloto-de-un-bus.shtml#.VDBMCudgPZs 
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generally know little or nothing about extortion schemes beyond their own direct 
involvement, and these arrests have not, in any case that I am aware of, resulted in the 
prosecution of any of the more powerful actors involved. Such law enforcement actions, 
in other words, work as a site of political performance in which politicians, judges, and 
prosecutors can show the public that they are doing something about violence on city 
buses, without getting any closer to identifying or prosecuting those behind extortion 
schemes. The nearly endless supply of poor young people desperate enough to take on 
such risky and low-paying work guarantees that these “successful” efforts at fighting 
extortion can continue indefinitely while violence continues unabated.  
 
Violence and the Municipal State 
In the context of fear and uncertainty generated by violence on city buses, rumors 
of government involvement in extortion schemes and driver assassinations are 
widespread, and can be heard form city residents from a range of social and political 
positions. In June of 2014, drivers on the Ruta Maya, which runs through zones 6 and 18, 
went on strike to protest the shootings of 25 drivers on that route alone in 2013 and to 
demand that the municipal government provide armed security guards for all units. 
Ostensibly in response to the consequent bus stoppage, which left thousands of residents 
without transportation, the Integrated System of Guatemalan Autobuses, a partnership 
between private bus companies and the national government, brought in Transurbano 
units to resume service.8 At the end of the strike the new units were kept in place, and 
drivers of red buses lost their jobs.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The structure and operation of the Transurbano system is described in detail below.  
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 A former Ruta Maya driver, in a recent interview with an online newspaper, 
questioned why the municipal government had refused their demands to provide security 
guards on buses, citing a lack of resources, and, after a year of unprecedented violence in 
which 25 drivers were killed, replaced their units with Transurbanos, all of which count 
with private security guards onboard.9  The driver was not implying mere negligence, but 
rather that the municipal government had intentionally taken advantage of a situation of 
extreme violence, standing by while drivers were killed, in order to justify the imposition 
of a new system. The author of the article goes a step further by pointing to a pattern in 
which the number of assassinations of bus drivers on a given route has spiked in the 
months before the implementation of a Transmetro or Transurbano route. In the context 
of public terror and outrage over heightened violence, drivers and unions struggle to find 
a receptive audience for the complaints over unfair labor practices, and the new systems 
can more smoothly replace the old. The author calls these patterns “suspicious,” and 
stops just short of accusing the government of direct complicity in the assassination of 
drivers on these routes.  
  Such accusations attribute a great deal of power and coherence to a municipal 
government that has supposedly orchestrated the systematic extortion and murder of 
hundreds of bus drivers, and then effectively covered up its own involvement. At the 
same time, rumors of complicity in extortion portray a weak municipal government, 
unable to control crime on existing buses or to stand up to bus owners and drivers’ unions 
in order to impose a new transportation system. This municipal state must instead use 
violence to create a widespread sense of fear in order to make its actions appear 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Osegueda, Sergio. “Asesinatos de Pilotos Coinciden a Cambios al Sistema de Buses. Diario Digital. 
10/13/2014. http://www.diariodigital.gt/2014/06/11/asesinatos-de-pilotos-coincidencias-en-cambios-al-
sistema-de-buses/ 
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necessary and inevitable. This picture is further complicated by the well-known 
involvement of politicians, officials, and police officers with bus companies, drivers, and 
unions. The benefits derived from these relationships and also the dangers they pose to 
those involved impact decision-making at every level, and presumably work to support or 
undermine official municipal strategies and responses to violence on buses in ways that 
are multiple and complex.  
 Such rumors and suspicions blend images of the Guatemala City government as 
weak and strong, as pulling the strings behind organized crime and as unable to intervene 
to stop violence on buses, and in doing so reveal what Nelson (2009:218) has identified 
as a deep ambivalence toward the postwar state, an uncomfortable mix of desire, fear, 
and revulsion. This ambivalence was perhaps most readily apparent in my own research 
in conversations with city residents from a variety of socioeconomic positions and 
political affiliations who openly stated their mistrust for police, who they saw as corrupt, 
abusive, and ineffective, but who also complained about the lack of police presence in 
buses, in the city center, and in their own neighborhoods. Not surprisingly, I found that 
complex and contradictory affective relationships with the state also mark city residents’ 
engagements with the Transmetro and Transurbano projects, though not always in the 
ways that I had imagined.  
 Such is the entanglement of actors constituting Guatemala City’s contemporary 
transportation crisis. Bus company owners negotiate with politicians to maintain their 
dominance within the mass transportation market while cutting costs in terms of both 
labor and maintenance, and their relationship with organized crime and the role of 
violence in these business tactics remains unclear. Drivers employ multiple strategies, 
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from union organizing and strikes to participation in extortion schemes, to make a living 
and keep themselves safe as widespread violence compounds the risk and vulnerability of 
what has long been a precarious occupation.  Those actors who administer extortion 
schemes collect hundreds of thousands of dollars a year from bus drivers and keep their 
identities and forms of organization hidden with remarkable success, while the faces of 
the poor youth who perform the labor of extortion and assassination for a just a few 
dollars are displayed on the cover of national newspapers. Bus users, primarily members 
of the city’s poor and working classes, have no option but to utilize the city’s 
transportation systems, with all their dangers and inconveniences, in their daily 
movement through the city. Also present in the above description are non-human features 
of Guatemala City’s bus systems: converted school buses with faulty breaks, the city’s 
mountainous terrain and extremely narrow streets and bridges, and neighborhoods, such 
those in zones 6 and 10, that are home to a large portion of the city’s bus users and are 
also the principal sites of violence on buses.    
 These actors and elements constitute the moving parts of the city’s bus systems. 
They are both the site of intervention and the raw materials with which politicians and 
planners must work in their efforts to create a secure and modern transportation system. 
Of course, these experts charged with remedying the city’s transportation crisis do not 
stand outside of, but rather form an integral part of, these systems. The following sections 
describe efforts to resolve the city’s ongoing transportation crisis and address violent 
crime on buses through the creation a bus rapid transit system.  
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Section II: Secure and Modern Transportation: The Transmetro and the 
Transurbano 
 
In 2007, as public concerns over violent crime on city buses began to mount, 
Guatemala City mayor Alvaro Arzú announced plans to introduce the Transmetro, an 
integrated transportation system based on the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) model. The BRT 
model is intended to combine the flexibility and relatively low capital investment of 
buses with the safety, efficiency, and positive public image of metro and light rail 
systems, and is characterized by high-capacity buses, dedicated lanes, accessible 
platforms, and off-site payment.10 With funding from the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank, the Transmetro project promised to address issues of 
security, but also to cut congestion and pollution by decreasing the number of private 
vehicles on the road and improving transportation times, especially during busy hours 
and on principal thoroughfares (González and Hartlben 2012:15).  
 While long-term plans for the Transmetro system include the construction of ten 
lines that connect the city’s center to its outermost barrios (see Figure 1 above), the 
Transmetro project has not amounted to a massive overhaul of the city’s transportation 
systems, but rather the gradual construction of lines over a 14-year period, with a target 
completion date of 2020. Figure One, taken from a 2012 presentation given by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The first BRT system was designed and implemented by municipal planners in Curitiba, Brazil, in the 
1970s. In the 1990s the BRT model gained widespread attention from municipal governments throughout 
the region as well as funders including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, which 
hailed the model as a relatively inexpensive solution to the formerly intractable problem of public 
transportation in large and medium size cities of the global south. While many of the first BRTs were 
introduced in Latin America and the region still has the majority of BRT systems, BRTs now operate in 
cities throughout the world including Istanbul, Jakarta, Brisbane, Quebec City, Cleveland, and Miami, 
among others (Levinson 2003). 
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Allesandra Loussau, Coordinator of Planning for the Transmetro, demonstrates the 
timeline for the expansion of the system, with two new routes to be established every two 
and a half years for twelve years. However, seven years after the project’s inauguration 
and slightly past the projected halfway point, only three lines—Eje Sur, Eje Corredor 
Central, and Eje Centro Historico— have been completed.  Routes leading to Zones 6 and 
18, the most densely populated areas of the city and also the location of the majority of 
bus robberies and driver assassinations that have taken place in recent years,11 were to be 
completed in 2009; but the process of construction began in February 2014 and continues 
slowly.  
Figure 1.12 
 
 Several factors have caused the slow and halting expansion of the Transmetro 
system. While BRT systems have been popular in large cities throughout Latin America 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 “Entrevisa Alcalde Álvaro Árzu.” Municipality of Guatemala City. 
http://www.muniguate.com/index.php/component/content/article/107-entrevistas/1348-entrevistaalcalde 
 
12 Lossau, Alessandra. “Transmetro: Sistema BRT de la Ciudad de Guatemala.” 
http://www.slideshare.net/sibrt/transmetro-sistema-brt-de-la-ciudad-de-guatemala-alessandra-lossau 
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largely because they are much less expensive than metro or subway systems, the 
Transmetro has in fact required intensive capital investment. Guatemala City’s dense 
development, narrow streets and bridges, and mountainous terrain make the construction 
of the dedicated bus lanes that the BRT model requires both technically challenging and 
extremely expensive. Each phase of construction and implementation has gone over 
budget, and the introduction of each subsequent line has been proceeded by an extended 
fundraising phase, in which resources from the municipal and national governments are 
supplemented by those of international funders such as the Inter-American Development 
Bank.  
 The Transmetro project has also required the municipal government to expend 
extensive non-monetary capital (or force, depending on one’s perspective). As discussed 
above, lines have replaced existing red bus routes, and as they have done so the 
municipal government has met resistance from both private bus companies and drivers’ 
unions. In the case of the Transurbano project, discussed in detail below, these interests 
have been especially strong, and negotiations have resulted not only in the extremely 
slow expansion of the system, but also in compromises in terms of its administrative 
structure that may impact the ability of the (in this case, national) state to provide safe 
and efficient transport in the long term.  
 
More Transmetro 
 Inspired by work within the critical anthropology of security (Goldstein 2011, 
2012; O’Neill et al 2011; Burrel 2010, 2014; Zeiderman 2013, 2014), I began my study 
of the Transmetro expecting to find points at which dominant narratives of security and 
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modernity broke down. By examining how the Transmetro, designed for an ideal and 
anonymous citizen-subject, might not have felt comfortable or secure for everyone 
(Murphy 2006), or how the aesthetics and the physical space of the Transmetro might be 
alienating rather than reassuring, I hoped to reveal distinct conceptions of what security, 
and by extension modernity, might look like.  
 These theoretical designs were quickly undermined by what city residents had to 
say, both in interviews and informal conversations. While many residents expressed 
frustration over the extremely slow progress of the Transmetro system, I heard very few 
complaints about the Transmetro itself. While exceptions are surely to be found in certain 
quarters, city residents with whom I spoke-- including researchers, yoga teachers, 
domestic workers, and human rights defenders, some identifying as ladino and others as 
indigenous, from a wide range of political orientations and locations in the city—love the 
Transmetro.  These residents enjoy the convenience and predictability of the system’s set 
routes and stops and they appreciate that the dedicated lanes, where they are in use, allow 
buses to cut through rush-hour traffic, making their trips faster. While one person 
commented that going to an office to load money on a card rather than being able to pay 
with cash is annoying, she also mentioned that she understands how the prepaid card 
makes the system function better more generally. No one I spoke with even seemed to 
mind the large “informative-inductive screens” installed in Transmetro units, which 
broadcast a loop of programming that combines information about the Transmetro system 
and orientation for users with inspirational quotes and photos of international celebrities 
and women in bathing suits.  
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 So, like the Zimbabwe bush pump (de Laet and Mol 2000), people seem to love 
the Transmetro. Unlike the case of the bushpump, however, the quality of the Transmetro 
that inspires this love is not fluidity. This bulky, complex, and capital-intensive form of 
infrastructure both requires and facilitates strong state presence and precludes, to a great 
extent, flexibility and adaptation. What people love about the Transmetro, among other 
things, is precisely what the Municipal government wants them to love: security. Several 
people echoed the Municipal government’s assertion that there have been zero cases of 
violent crime on the Transmetro, and they credited the security mechanisms -- from 
guarded stations and the presence of municipal police on buses, to the use of prepayment 
systems and the separation of the driver from the passengers by bullet-proof plastic—
with preventing robberies and extortion on Transmetro buses. People I spoke to also 
reported feeling that the Transmetro is safe, and feeling safe on the Transmetro. In other 
words, the Transmetro is not only effective in ensuring the security of riders, it is also 
affective, in the sense of creating a feeling of security that goes beyond mere incidence of 
crime or lack thereof (Masco 1999).  I do mean to not suggest that city residents share in 
any unified or complete way a vision or experience of security, amongst themselves or 
with the municipal state. Rather, I suspect that the severity of violence on red buses, from 
robberies to secuestros to the assassination of drivers, has brought together many 
residents behind a basic demand for security, defined minimally as the absence of these 
forms of violence.  
 When people complain about the Transmetro, they most often complain about its 
very limited coverage, which makes it almost impossible for residents to use this secure 
and modern form of transport as their principal way to move around the city. Residents 
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complain that the Transmetro has not come to their neighborhood, either because of 
delays in the system’s expansion or because they are not on one of the planned routes, 
and question the Municipal government’s commitment to providing secure and efficient 
transportation to all city residents. In other words, city residents consider the Transmetro 
effective as a transport system, but not as a solution to violence, inefficiency, and other 
issues that plague the city’s existing systems.  What city residents want, then, is more 
Transmetro. What they will mostly likely get, however, is something quite different.  
 
The Transurbano 
 If and when the municipal government does establish all of the system’s planned 
routes, this will mean greatly expanded coverage and greater access to the Transmetro 
from many areas of the city. However, very few city residents will be able to begin using 
the Transmetro as their primary form of transportation. The number of routes and their 
distribution will mean that for many residents the Transmetro will not provide the most 
direct route between their home, work, and school, and all but a small proportion of 
residents who do use the Transmetro will need to use it in conjunction with another form 
of public transportation. For example, while nearly 200,000 people live in zone 18, the 
zone will have only one Transmetro line when the municipal plan is complete.  
  The Transmetro system is not, in fact, intended to cover all city bus routes. 
Similar to subway or metro systems in other cities, the Transmetro system will provide a 
network of lines, supported by a “feeder” system (See Figure 2), in this case the 
Transurbano. The Transurbano is a system of buses operated in the Guatemala City 
Metropolitan Area (AMCG) by the Integrated System of Guatemalan Autobuses, a 
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public-private partnership between the national government and the Association of Urban 
Bus Owners (consisting of the same bus companies discussed above). The system’s 
operations are supervised by the Superintendent of Public Transportation, part of the 
Guatemala City municipal government. Initiated in 2010, the project aims to eventually 
replace all of the city’s buses rojos with Transurbano units (see Figure 2 below. The 
green bus is a Transmetro and the blue bus a Transurbano).  
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 While Transurbano units do not count with all the security mechanisms of the 
Transmetro system, for example guarded stations and designated lanes, they do utilize 
prepayment technologies and designated stops (unlike red buses, which stop anywhere 
passengers are waiting), both mechanisms designed to increase security. The main issue 
with the Transurbano, like the Transmetro, is the lack of sufficient coverage. The 
purchase and distribution of new units, and the public-private partnerships involved, have 
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been subject to frequent accusations of corruption, such as in 2010 when, according to 
rumors that I heard from multiple sources but was unable to substantiate, the Secretary of 
Transportation supposedly paid millions of quetzals to a Brazilian company for the 
purchase of 3,500 buses, and somehow ended up with only 445 buses, far from sufficient 
for covering promised routes.  
 Unlike the Transmetro, which is subsidized by the national government and 
administered by the municipal government, with many functions such as maintenance 
subcontracted to private companies, Transurbanos are units purchased by the national 
government with a mix of public and private funds. These units are provided to private 
bus companies, which own and operate them, in exchange for both conditions such as 
maintaining fixed routes and stops and the provision of increased subsidies. The 
companies operating Transurbanos are the same powerful companies that operate red 
buses, with their suspected involvement in organized crime and extortion as well as their 
well-know history of both labor abuses and provision of bus services that are consistently 
both inefficient and unsafe. Nonetheless, red bus drivers on these routes are replaced with 
“professional” drivers, subject to training and background checks. While this policy aims 
to eliminate drivers who have been involved in criminal or gang activity and bring in 
those who will be less vulnerable to involvement in extortion, it has, not surprisingly, 
encountered resistance from drivers themselves and their unions, who claim that officials 
and politicians are taking advantage the new arrangement to provide jobs to friends and 
family members.  
 At the time when I conducted fieldwork, riders as well as advocates generally 
agreed that Transurbanos were safer than red buses, though not as safe as the Transmetro. 
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While there had been some reported robberies, there was no evidence of drivers being 
subjected to extortion. However, these same people recognized that while Transurbanos 
have the same shiny paint and municipal logos as the Transmetro, they are not controlled 
by the municipal government but by the same companies that operate red buses, and that 
the ability and will of these companies to protect buses from extortion in the longer term 
is highly questionable.  All of this suggests that the Transurbano project, far from 
extending the Transmetro’s ambitious, if only partially realized, ideal of creating an 
urban planning and engineering solution to Guatemala City’s security crisis, represents a 
fundamentally realpolitik negotiation between politicians and officials at both the state 
and municipal level and bus company owners, with the direct or indirect involvement of 
organized crime interests.  
 
Rendering Security Technical  
 The municipal government’s Plan Guatemala 2020, published in 2005, outlines a 
plan for urban mobility with goals to be reached by the year 2020. This document, the 
most recent comprehensive urban development plan published by the municipal 
government, portrays an urban transportation system with problems that can be addressed 
through the mechanisms available to planners, engineers, and policy makers: the 
regularization of routes, improved systems for informing the public of traffic accidents 
and delays, the implementation of a modern and transparent tariff payment system, and 
greater enforcement of traffic laws.13 The masterplan for the Transmetro system, released 
three years later, also focuses on planning and engineering solutions, but shows a much 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “Movilidad Humana.” Municipality of Guatemala City. 
http://www.muniguate.com/index.php/g2020/5372-g2020movurbana 
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greater deal of technical specificity, laying out route locations and schedules and 
describing mechanisms of policing and surveillance, communication, and control of 
movement. These documents lay out ambitious strategies to address Guatemala City’s 
violence on city buses through planning and infrastructure design, and what they have in 
common is the application of technical solutions to what are seen, by many, as intractable 
social, political, and economic problems. 
 In keeping with the theoretical framing discussed above in relation to 
infrastructure, I have found it productive to view the Transmetro project in relation to 
Li’s work on development interventions in Indonesia (2007). Li asserts that in order to 
devise a program of intervention, experts must first “render technical” a given problem 
by defining it within a bounded and intelligible field of intervention, such that it is 
amenable to technical solutions. Here, there is an intimate relationship between the 
identification and definition of a problem and the available potential solutions. Experts’ 
claims to expertise “depend on their capacity to diagnose problems in ways that match 
the kinds of solutions that fall within their repertoire” (2007:7). Re-framing questions in 
technical terms means excluding a whole range of factors that are outside of the influence 
of the resources and mechanisms that planners and other experts have at their disposal. 
These include political-economic questions “about control over the means of production, 
and the structures of law and force that support systematic inequalities” (Li 2007:11).  
 This process of “rendering technical” and the related processes of exclusion are 
clearly evident in the documents cited above. Not surprisingly, neither plan 
acknowledges or directly addresses the underlying social and economic causes of crime 
and violence, such as poverty, corruption, residential segregation, and lack of 
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employment. What is perhaps more noteworthy is the highly bounded and circumscribed 
nature of the Transmetro as an intervention to address urban violence. The Transmetro 
project literally aims to place mobile zones of supposedly absolute security in some of the 
city’s most insecure neighborhoods. The irony of this kind of solution was apparent in 
one conversation I had with Gerson, a young man who lives relatively nearby a stop on 
the Transmetro’s Centra Sur line. The Transmetro is so safe, he explained, that you can 
even get out your IPhone and check your email on the bus. “I would never do that, of 
course,” he quickly added. “If I did, someone would follow me off the bus and steal my 
phone.” In neighborhoods where such armed robberies are frequent and often result in 
shooting deaths, this is not merely a matter of potentially losing a phone. While planners 
and administrators have demonstrated their capacity to make Transmetro buses into 
largely theft-free zones through the implementation of a range of highly coordinated 
safety mechanisms (and to install WiFi in all Transmetro units, a point of pride 
emphasized in the system’s propaganda), they can do nothing to protect Gerson from a 
potentially deadly robbery in the several blocks between the bus stop and his house.  
 At the outset of my research, I suspected that municipal planners with modernist 
ambitions might imagine municipal-green Transmetro buses and bus stops as “subversive 
set pieces” with the potential to transform landscapes of urban violence through their 
very presence (Holston 1989:53). While my inability to gain access to spaces of planning 
and design during fieldwork severely limit my ability to confirm or deny such theories, 
municipal plans, speeches by officials, and other documentary sources continue to 
suggest modernist principles of ecological determinism as at least one of the ideologies 
underpinning the Transmetro and other municipal development projects. Such ambitions, 
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to the extent that they drive infrastructure projects in Guatemala City, come up against 
the realities of urban poverty and violence that are as ubiquitous as they are apparently 
intractable. A more modest faith in infrastructure and its ability to create bounded spaces 
of relatively safety, but not to transform its surroundings, is reflected in Gerson’s 
assertion that while the Transmetro is a great change (un gran cambio) for him and other 
residents of his neighborhood, he will continue to keep his phone in his backpack while 
riding the bus.  
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Section III: ¡Modernízate!: Citizenship, Security and Transportation 
 When city residents walk by the Transmetro station at the corner of Sixth Avenue 
and Third Street, they see a large poster with bright green print, urging them to 
“¡Modernízate!” (Modernize yourself!). Under the text is a photo of a group of 
Transmetro riders, including youth with backpacks, a person in a wheelchair, and two 
women in indigenous dress or traje that identifies them as Ixil and Quiche. At the bottom 
of the photo is information about how you, like these diverse city residents, can 
modernize yourself by going to the nearest Transmetro office and getting your own 
personalized Transmetro card. Similar posters demonstrate the behaviors required of 
Transmetro users: carrying identification, ceding bus seats to the elderly, turning in found 
items to Transmetro staff, and reporting suspicious activity. While these might simply 
appear to the guidelines or regulations for system users, they are presented here as 
something more: interpellation into a form of modern municipal citizenship. 
 Such campaigns have been an integral part of the Transmetro since its inception, 
and they reflect what planners identify as the project’s “socio-urban” goals, laid out in a 
2012 report by Transmetro consultants:   
1. To change citizens’ manner of behaving, including the development of a culture 
of waiting in line, not throwing trash on the floor, and ceding space to those in 
need. 
2. To create a chain effect that transforms the conditions around the system, 
including formal and informal commerce, the use of space, and urban landmarks 
and icons.  
3. To change the mentality of a people (un pueblo), breaking current paradigms and 
opening up opportunities for new projects. (González and Hartlben 2012:15) 
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 Alongside municipal campaigns such as those that form part of the Transmetro 
project, a range of civil society groups have launched public campaigns to promote active 
and responsible citizenship as a solution to problems of insecurity in Guatemala City. 
“Plan Guatemala 2020+,” a proposal for comprehensive development released by the 
group Compromiso Ciudadana in 2011, provides an example of a call for greater citizen 
responsibility in the development of the city’s transportation systems from outside 
(though not far outside) the municipal building. Compromiso Ciudadana, a “civic 
committee” and would-be political party (their 2011 mayoral candidate lost to incumbent 
Alvaro Arzú), has been one of the organizations to most explicitly link questions of 
citizenship to infrastructure and urban development. In their Plan Guatemala City 2020+, 
they outline their proposal for a “shared agenda” between citizens and those who govern 
for the city’s long-term development. This agenda is primarily focused on what could be 
called questions of infrastructure, including water and sewage, housing and zoning, and 
especially transportation. And though addressing these elements of urban development 
commonly assumed to be the domain of the state, they emphasize throughout the 
importance of “cultures of citizenship” and the responsibilities of city residents in 
creating “una ciudad para vivir” (a city to live in, or a livable city). While the authors of 
Plan 2020+ call on the municipal government to implement new development projects to 
improve existing infrastructure, they also make it clear that the real transformation of 
Guatemala City will come about through a transformation of its residents “from 
neighbors into citizens” (2011:4). They define citizenship culture, here, as “the 
intersection of customs, actions, and minimum standards of behavior that generate a 
sense of belonging, facilitate ‘convivencia urbana’ (urban social life), and lead to respect 
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for our common patrimony and to the recognition of our citizenship rights and 
responsibilities” (2011: 4).  This citizenship culture is to be achieved through the “re-
education of beliefs and habits, with the intention of modifying ideas, attitudes, and 
behaviors” of city residents (2011: 4).  
 Compromiso Ciudadana’s framework is applied to questions of transportation in a 
section titled “Constructing a Citizenship for Mobility,” which outlines practices for the 
construction of a “Cultura de Convivencia Vial (Culture of Roadway Sharing)” 
(2011:16). Here, the authors suggest the implementation of a permanent campaign of 
citizen education, including neighborhood events with recreational activities for children, 
as a solution to the city’s transportation problems, from crime to traffic accidents. And 
while the report calls for the municipal and national governments to address insecurity 
through a range of efforts from the completion of the Transmetro to the reform of judicial 
systems, it suggests that the solution to crime and violence will ultimately come from 
citizens themselves. It cites the successful cases of other cities (which remain 
unspecified) in “dramatically reducing delinquency” (4) through active and responsible 
citizenship, suggesting that Guatemala City residents, through their own self-
transformation from “neighbors to citizens,” could do the same.  
 Compromiso Ciudadana’s campaign can be understood as an example of the 
emerging forms of middle and upper-middle class security politics identified by several 
critical scholars of urban violence and security (Caldeira 2000; 2008; Coelho 2011; Low 
2003). Largely but exclusively centered in neighborhood organizations, this emerging 
politics employs ‘civilized’ modes of engagement such as media campaigns, public 
forums, and courts rather than mass strikes and public demonstrations associated with 
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popular urban politics (Coelho 2011: 23). Here, those who are arguably less affected by 
crime and violence but have greater access to political and economic resources are 
shaping the security agenda and mobilizing security discourse to further their interests. 
As a movement of middle and upper class city residents, many with ties of either business 
or municipal government, Compromiso Ciudadana articulates a security agenda that 
eschews the language of rights and demands for that of empowerment and responsibility, 
a position that is arguably less viable for residents living in gang-dominated 
neighborhoods or relying on forms of mass transportation in which violent crime is an 
ever-present possibility.  
 In an ethnographic study of Christian citizenship in postwar Guatemala, O’Neill 
(2010) describes the appearance of glossy citizenship campaigns in Guatemala City, 
directed by the municipal government, groups of elite ladinos, and evangelical mega 
churches. These campaigns place slogans such as “Tú Eres la Ciudad” (You are the City) 
and “Soy la Revolución” (I am the Revolution) on billboards, bus stops, t-shirts, and 
bumper stickers, and encourage residents to transform the city one day at a time by 
changing their own attitudes and behavior. Drawing on the work of Foucault (1986), 
Rose (1996) and O’Malley (1990), O’Neill suggests that citizenship can best be 
understood as “a kind of subjectivity that has certain responsibilities and dispositions,” 
among them the capacity for self-governance (14). Viewed from this perspective, these 
campaigns can be understood as interpellating city residents into a particular kind of 
neoliberal citizen-subjectivity where the responsibility for social change lies squarely on 
the individual. “Rather than prompting the state or multinationals, for example, to do 
things the promise of citizenship makes people do things, to themselves and often by 
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themselves (2010:214).” And in a context in which substantive citizenship in the form of 
social and economic rights and political inclusion is elusive for many, it is precisely this 
“do it yourself” citizenship that offers to extend its responsibilities to all city residents.    
 Much like the campaigns that O’Neill examines, we see in the call to 
“¡modernízate!” the clear “hey you!” of the municipal state, interpellating city residents 
as modern municipal citizens. Citizens can take responsibility for the city’s transportation 
systems, and in doing so can improve security for themselves and their neighbors. 
O’Neill’s critique of such campaigns and the forms of transformation they offer is 
relevant here as well. O’Neill concludes his study with reflections on the limits of 
citizenship, in general and in the specific context of violence and inequality that shape 
life in contemporary Guatemala City. Ideologies of citizenship, whether promoted by the 
evangelical mega churches that are the main focus of O’Neill’s ethnography, the 
municipal government, or civil society groups, ask citizens themselves to shoulder the 
weight of Guatemala City’s multiple forms of crisis, and to pull the city out of the depths 
of crime, violence, and poverty through the strength of their attitudes and actions. Not 
only do such ideologies present the danger of exempting the state and other powerful 
actors from responsibility for the multiple forms of violence and insecurity that they have 
been complicit in creating and continue to benefit from, it also sets up for failure those 
city residents who are interpellated as municipal citizens. Learning to wait in line, to 
place trash in the proper receptacle, to give your bus seat to mothers with children—in 
other words, to modernize yourself-- might make urban public life more pleasant, more 
orderly, more hygienic, and even more livable. However, as O’Neill points out, such 
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changes in “cultures of citizenship” stop far short of addressing conditions of inequality 
and exclusion that drive and perpetuate violence in Guatemala City.  
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Section IV: La Defensoría Del Usuario: Transportation as a Human Right 
As I waited to be shown to the office of Carlos, who works in the Defensoría del Usuario 
de Transporte Publico within the Procurador de Derechos Humanos, a woman in her 
thirties dressed in traje characteristic of the Quich’e region entered the reception area. 
After telling the receptionist that she was there to speak with someone in the Defensoría 
de Derechos Indígenas, she sat down beside me and pulled a thermos of coffee and a bag 
of tortillas out of her bag. Carefully arranging her breakfast on her lap as if she knew she 
was in for a long wait, she explained to me that she lives in Quich’e with her family but 
comes to the capital, where she works as an accountant Monday through Friday. She had 
come to the Defensoría to register an official denuncia against a group of men who work 
in a parking garage near her office and harass her every day on her way to work, making 
comments about her clothing and her presumably rural origins. She explained that this 
was her first time at the Procurador, but that she had heard that “this is where you come 
when you know you have human rights, and you know it’s wrong that they’re not 
respected.”  
 At first the location of the Oficina del Usuario in the Procurador de Derechos 
Humanos may seem surprising, in a country where “human rights” as a term and a 
concept has been closely associated with indigenous rights, and with efforts to denounce 
the horrific violence of the country’s 35 year civil war. During the Peace Accords process 
and in the context of ongoing racism, discrimination, and exclusion of the country’s 
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indigenous majority (as well as the ongoing denial of genocide by many of the country’s 
political elite), the human rights “toolkit,” including international law, mechanisms of 
monitoring and denunciation, and a vast network of international supporters, continues to 
be central to efforts to assert and defend indigenous rights.  
 The Procurador itself was established by Congress in 1985 under a military 
government, two years before peace negotiations would officially begin, and can be seen, 
at least in part, as an attempt to pacify those in Guatemala and abroad who criticized the 
government’s genocidal campaigns. Nonetheless, the Procurador functions fairly 
independently from the Guatemalan government, and continues to be one of the primary 
recourses for those seeking to denounce human rights abuses, including those committed 
by, or in complicity with, the state. In the 1990s and 2000s the Procurador greatly 
expanded the reach of its work, creating Defensorías of Sexual Diversity, Youth, People 
with Disabilities, and Migrants and Displaced People. The creation of these offices, 
according to Procurador staff, both reflect expanding definitions of human rights 
internationally and represent efforts to expand the range of rights that are recognized and 
respected, both within the legal system and within Guatemalan society in general.  As the 
human rights toolkit has proved remarkably effective in the postwar and post-postwar 
period in securing international financial support and moral backing for the rights of 
indigenous peoples, as well as some concrete legal and policy reform, organizations like 
the Procurador have mobilized this toolkit for other struggles.  
 The creation of the Defensoría del Usuario de Transporte Publico in 2013 was an 
effort, in response to violence on city buses as well as ongoing issues of safety and 
efficiency, to define safe, efficient, and dignified public transportation as a human right.  
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In light of Guatemala’s particularly dramatic history of both human rights abuses and 
human rights activism, urban transportation as a human right might seem, in a word, 
mundane. However, as evidenced in the history of student and worker mobilization 
around city bus systems detailed above, urban transport in Guatemala City has been 
anything but apolitical.  Additionally, human rights organizations and activists who 
fought for justice, reparations, and reform in the civil war and post-war period are 
increasingly dedicating their energies to questions of urban violence, organized crime, 
and related impunity. This application of the language and the legal tools of human rights 
to address Guatemala’s contemporary “security crisis” provides a precedent for the 
Procudoria’s efforts to approach violence on buses as an issue of human rights.  
 In our interview, I asked Carlos what it means, in practice, to define public 
transportation as a human right. He responded by describing the various facets of the 
work of the Defensoría del Usuario, which mirror the strategies of the other Defensorías 
within the Procurador. The work of the office centers, largely, around the denuncia, a 
denunciation or complaint. A denuncia can be presented by a citizen to a higher authority, 
traditionally the state but increasingly non-state actors as well, against a wide range of 
actors, from police or state agencies to corporations to neighbors. While the denuncia as a 
legal mechanism is not specific to human rights in Guatemala, it has been employed 
widely by organizations and activists to draw public attention to rights violations while 
demanding some form of justice or reparation. This mechanism, like the citizenship 
campaigns described above, can be understood as a form of interpellation, calling on city 
residents to enact a particular kind of citizenship, in this case based on awareness of one’s 
own rights and the ability to make demands on the state.  
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 Shortly after he joined the Procurador, Carlos’s office launched public education 
campaigns to make Guatemala City residents aware of their rights in relation to public 
transportation, as well channels for denouncing any violations. The Defensoría accepts 
such denuncias, both in the office as well as through a hotline set up for this purpose. 
City residents can call the hotline to denounce anything from armed robbery to 
discrimination to reckless driving or improper bus maintenance. Staff of the Defensoría 
also collect denuncias through periodic monitoring efforts in strategically chosen sites. 
For example, during Semana Santa (Holy Week), a time in which many Guatemalan 
families travel, Carlos and his team, along with a group of national police officers, set up 
a check point along one of the highways heading out of town. They randomly boarded 
buses, clipboards in hand, and gave passengers the opportunity to sign pre-printed 
denuncias related to bus overcrowding, improperly maintained brakes, and inflated bus 
fares imposed during the holiday season.  
 Carlos proudly explained that in the three months before he joined the Defensoría, 
only 20 denuncias were registered. Over the following nine months, under his direction, 
the office registered 900 denuncias, and by the time I interviewed Carlos in June the 
count for 2014 was up to 3,800 denuncias. While the majority of Carlos’s time and 
energy is devoted to addressing violence on city buses, including driver assassinations 
and the emerging phenomenon of secuestros or kidnapping of buses, the great majority of 
these denuncias are related to issues such as mechanical safety and bus overcrowding. In 
explaining the high proportion of denuncias focused on these more “mundane” sorts of 
rights violations, Carlos insists on two points. First, that city residents have a human right 
to transportation that is both safe and dignified. 
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traffic accidents in and around the city, most of which could have been prevented by 
appropriate bus upkeep and more careful driving. Additionally, for the thousands of 
residents who rely on red buses as their primary form of transportation, being forced to 
stand in a crowded aisle for several hours per day or to pay illegally inflated fares is a 
violation of their basic human dignity. In our conversations as well as in his public 
communications, Carlos is at pains to stress the ways in which these issues that form part 
of Guatemala City’s longer-term transportation crisis shape the lives, livelihoods, and 
wellbeing of residents. Just as importantly, he emphasizes the importance of what he calls 
a “culture of denuncias,” the general awareness that one has rights, the conviction that 
these rights should be respected, and the knowledge and ability to seek out the proper 
channel to protest rights violations. In Guatemala, he suggests, 36 years of civil war and 
state violence and ongoing violence and impunity have left people generally scared, 
mistrustful, and suspicious, and education is needed to foment a “culture” in which 
Guatemalans both demand respect for their own rights and defend those of others.14  In 
this understanding, the act of denouncing violations is valuable for those who participate, 
regardless of the content or the results.   
 While the vast majority of denuncias focus on these more mundane types of 
violations, people do come to the Defensoría office or call the hotline to report incidents 
of crime and violence on buses. Over the past few months, several passengers who were 
onboard buses during armed robberies have called the hotline and the Defensoría has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 I have heard similar comments about the deficits of Guatemala’s “postwar citizenship culture” from 
almost every politician or public official I have spoken with, and several researchers, teachers and business 
owners. Such statements, in addition to pathologizing the effects of war and violence, are problematic for 
their positioning of the speaker (educated professional) outside of a dynamic that is implicitly understood to 
apply to those who were most directly victimized during the civil war (rural indigenous people, many of 
whom have now joined the ranks of the urban poor.) 
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been able to follow up with the police and the Ministerio Publico to push for a more 
immediate response and thorough investigation. The Defensoría has collaborated with 
investigators and prosecutors, using information drawn from denuncias, in the successful 
apprehension of at least a few bus robbers. What has proven more of a challenge for the 
Defensoría’s staff is intervention in precisely the phenomena that most concerns them, 
the extortion and assassination of drivers. A few bus drivers have come to the Defensoría 
seeking to file a denuncia against extortionists. Such actions expose bus drivers, while the 
extreme difficulty in identifying and prosecuting those behind extortion schemes, due in 
part to the complexity of the powerful interests involved, as well as the inability of the 
Procurador to offer immediate and effective forms of protection to these drivers, limits 
what the Defensoría can do to help them if they chose to come forward. It is of little 
surprise, then, that so few do. This dilemma highlights the vulnerability of drivers who, 
as the principal victims of violence on buses, have few mechanisms at their exposal for 
demanding respect for their rights to either security or justice. Such obstacles to the 
Defensoría’s work point to some potential limits to the human rights model of public 
denuncias, developed largely to address human rights violation by the state, in addressing 
the decentralized networks of state and non-state actors responsible for much of 
contemporary violence in Guatemala City.  
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Conclusion: Rights and responsibilities 
 The citizenship campaigns and the work of the Defensoría described above 
represent distinct approaches to resolving Guatemala City’s contemporary “transportation 
crisis.” Both campaigns propose solutions to crime and violence related to shifts in 
“culture,” understood as a shared set of civic values, attitudes, and behaviors 
(Compromiso Ciudana 2011:4). However, the form of these intended shifts and the hopes 
for results are distinct. The municipal government’s “¡Modernízate!” campaign and 
Compromiso Ciudadana’s Plan Guatemala 2020+ call on residents to transform 
themselves from city residents to municipal citizens by taking personal responsibility for 
their city and its bus systems. By learning and practicing certain behaviors associated 
with modern citizenship, such as boarding buses in an orderly fashion, not sharing one’s 
personal prepayment card with others, and reporting suspicious activity to the proper 
authorities, residents can do their part to make buses more secure. It is important to note 
that this conception of citizenship, while it employs the language of empowerment and 
responsibility, is quite distinct from those evident in neighborhood self-defense patrols 
(Goldstein 2012; Sieder 2011) or even the hiring of private security guards (Caldeira 
2000; Dinzey-Flores 2010; O’Neill et al 2011). Despite all the rhetoric of citizens 
transforming their city, this is a highly centralized and state-centric vision of security that 
asks residents not to take their safety into their own hands, but rather to behave in such a 
way as to facilitate, rather than impede, the efficient functioning of state security 
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measures. The modern citizenship culture proposed by these campaigns, then, is largely a 
culture of following the rules, of respecting authority, and of maintaining minimum 
standards of order and hygiene.  
 The Defensoría, in contrast, is attempting to foment a culture of citizenship in 
which Guatemalans recognize their own rights and their ability and responsibility to 
make demands upon the state.  The state here is not assumed to be the guarantor of 
security and development, but rather a fragmented and complex institution with the 
potential to both defend and undermine human rights, in need of constant vigilance and 
prodding by both citizens and their advocates. Additionally, while the citizenship 
campaigns above celebrate diversity through their images of bus users, their conception 
of citizenship culture leaves little space for difference in relation to engagement with 
public transportation systems. In contrast, the location of the Defensoría del Usuario 
inside the Procurador and its close interaction with the other Defensorías, including 
Defensorías of Women, Older Adults, and People with Disabilities, has allowed for a 
more explicit focus on how age, gender, ethnicity, and ability shape both the experiences 
and needs of transportation users. 
 In this paper I have outlined three distinct approaches to violent crime on buses in 
Guatemala City and other longstanding problems with the city’s transportation systems. 
This analysis highlights both the techniques and the underlying logics at work in these 
state and civil society projects: The Transmetro and Transurbano projects employ varying 
proportions of technical interventions and political negotiation and compromise in order 
to display a strong state response to crime on buses while simultaneously placating 
private business; citizenship campaigns led by the municipal government and civil 
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society groups use billboards and other forms of public media to call on citizens to take 
responsibility to act in a way that facilitates these state projects; and the Defensoría del 
Usuario the mechanism of denuncias to empower citizens to make demands on the state 
based in a conception of safety as a human rights. All three of these projects work to 
mobilize non-state actors, from city residents to private businesses, while maintaining a 
central role for the state vision of secure transportation.   
 Taken together, these projects reveal a range of conceptualizations of security, 
from the absence of crime in delimited spaces to the provision of protections by the state. 
They also reveal distinct ways in which rights and responsibilities are allocated within 
security projects. The Transmetro and Transurbano systems themselves, as major 
infrastructure projects, are assumed to be the responsibility of the municipal and national 
governments, with city residents receiving the benefits. However, the projects’ 
accompanying citizenship campaigns call on city residents to take an active role in 
assuring the functioning of the system and by extension their own security. Similarly, 
while organizations such as Compromiso Ciudadano focus on the responsibilities of 
residents for transforming their city, they also call on the municipal government to 
comply with its own responsibilities, principally related to infrastructure and urban 
development. In these cases we see an idealized division of labor, with the state providing 
infrastructure that facilitates security while citizens do their part by behaving in ways that 
keep themselves and their fellow citizens safe. In the case of the Defensoría, city 
residents, including bus drivers and riders, are to hold the state responsible by presenting 
denuncias, This very process places responsibility on residents themselves for ensuring 
that the state complies with its responsibilities. What this analysis reveals, then, are not 
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straightforward divisions, either between state and civil society projects or between 
conceptualizations of security as right or security as responsibility. Rather, efforts to 
address violence on Guatemala City buses reveal an intertwining, within and between 
specific projects, of distinct techniques and visions of security and how it can be 
achieved.  
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